You write that the rise of ISIS in Iraq was not inevitable but a function of failed policies on the part of the Obama administration, especially in 2010. What could we have done differently?

The biggest mistake of the Obama administration was not upholding the right of Iraqiyya, the winning bloc in the 2010 elections, to have a first go at trying to form the government. I do not think that Ayad Allawi, the leader of Iraqiyya, would have been able to form a government with himself as Prime Minister, however I do think that if the US had upheld the process it could have led to Allawi agreeing to share power with Maliki or his agreeing to a third candidate such as Adel Abdul Mehdi of the Supreme Council.

Instead, the US insisted on keeping the incumbent, Maliki, in power, believing that this was the easiest and quickest route to forming the government and that he would allow a follow-on security agreement to keep US troops in Iraq after 2011. But Maliki was deeply unpopular among the elites. Despite US pressure on Iraqiyya they were not willing to agree to Maliki remaining as Prime Minister. In the end, Iran succeeded in pressuring the Sadrists to agree to a second Maliki term, contingent upon no new agreement to keep US troops in country.

The consequences of this policy mistake have been devastating. The opportunity was missed to broker an agreement among the elites, the nascent democratic system was undermined, and an opening was provided for Iran to greatly increase its influence leading to the narrative in the region that the US had ‘lost’ Iraq to Iran.

During his second term, Maliki pursued sectarian policies, pushing Sunni leaders out of the political process, reneging on promises to tribal leaders who had fought against al-Qaeda, and subverting institutions including the security forces. This led to widespread Sunni alienation and created the environment for the rise of ISIS.

How would you grade the new government of Haider Abadi?

Abadi seems to have the will to bring about reforms, but he does not have the capacity. Non-state actors in Iraq today are stronger than the state. Little progress has been made in reconciliation with Sunnis. Abdi is hampered by Shia militias who are fearful that if weapons are given to the Sunnis to fight against the Islamic State, they will use them against the Shia. Iran remains the dominant power propping up the Iraqi government and this makes reconciliation harder.

In a fit of déjà vu, Frederick Kagan and Jack Keane are devising a new surge strategy, much like the one they conjured up in 2007. Is this the right approach? 

ISIS can only be defeated by the Sunnis in Iraq. And they will only turn against ISIS when they see it cannot win, that there are better alternatives, and that they are supported by the Iraqi government and the US. But so far, there is little progress in persuading and enabling Sunnis to fight ISIS.

It seems we spent the better part of a decade training Iraqi forces, yet they scrambled at the first sight of an estimated 200 ISIS rebels in Ramadi?

The Iraqi security forces had quickly disintegrated in June 2014 in Mosul as the Islamic State advanced. Although they far outnumbered the Islamic State and had been better equipped, they were poorly led—there was no official chain of command through the Ministry of Defense. Instead, Maliki gave instructions by phone call and text. Maliki had replaced competent officers—who had worked closely with the US military—with people loyal to himself. Corruption was rife. Some had taken the funds meant to buy food for their soldiers. None gave orders to their forces to fight.

With politics in Iraq so contested, it is impossible to build up an effective national army. As we have seen, you can give the Iraqi army lots of equipment and training but the psychology and morale of the force—and its willingness to fight—is deeply affected by the lack of a political agreement on what the nation should be.

We are where we are. What do you think should be the policy of the US government?

Obama needs to bring together Iran, Turkey and Saudi Arabia to hammer out an agreement on how to deal with ISIS and what a post-I