The rise of ISIS has given America an enemy that it clearly must fight. Yet, public and political reluctance to fully commit to that fight has left America militarily constrained in its war against ISIS.  Ironically, these military constraints (most notably the lack of American ground forces) has left it in a situation not unlike that of the terrorist groups America has been fighting for the past fourteen years.  Like groups such as al-Qaeda, the Haqqani network, and others, America now seeks to destroy a state ISIS without the requisite military capabilities for a conventional military victory, though, in America’s case, this is not due to lack of capability, but rather political limitations.  Understanding the strategies of these terrorist organizations can help the US reorient its military policy in regard to ISIS and more effectively achieve its underlying goal of eradicating ISIS.

State of Play

While weapons and techniques of terrorist organizations have changed over time, from the Sons of Liberty to the Black Hand to al Qaeda the core strategy of these groups has remained constant. These military ill-equipped and resource-poor groups overcome seemingly insurmountable asymmetries in capabilities by focusing not on a conventional military victory, but on disrupting or undermining the incumbent government’s function and legitimacy.  Examples of actions in furtherance of this strategy include assassinations, attacks on civilians, and destruction of government buildings and property.  While often these actions are morally reprehensible, the effects can often be devastating to the incumbent government.  Even limited attacks can create internal unrest and pressure from a populace that quickly loses faith in the government’s ability to provide good governance and safety – two central responsibilities of any government.

Yet, despite America also lacking the ability to achieve a conventional military victory over ISIS, American military strategy in no way reflects that fact.  The US’s insistence on trying to defeat ISIS through militarily crippling it is demonstrated in data outlining American airstrikes against ISIS between September 2014 and February 2015.   Of the 4,817 targets struck by the American military in that time frame, less than 3% were against ISIS’s oil production facilities, and only 1.4% was against key ISIS infrastructure.  The vast majority of strikes were military in nature (i.e. tanks, bunkers, troops, artillery, staging areas, etc.).  While this military focus has undoubtedly played a role in limiting the expansion of ISIS,