It was August 1985, and I was one of several Navy “docs” supporting several hundred U.S. Marines as they prepared for a dramatic amphibious assault 30 miles west of Alexandria, Egypt. We’d spent nearly a month ashore for the operation, then the largest joint military exercise ever held in the Middle East. Its timing was not purely coincidental. Just months earlier, four British citizens were released after being held hostage by the Libyan Government for several months. But my concern was heat exhaustion and stroke due to hundred-degree-plus daytime temperatures; maintaining sources of potable water; keeping Marines from playing with the “wildlife” (camel spiders and scorpions). Then there was the human waste disposal, to avoid the buildup of filth flies and related food-borne illnesses.
Fluid waste disposal back then was simple; there were no women deployed so we simply set aside specific areas and inserted tubes into the ground where Marines could urinate. Solid human waste disposal, however, was a bit more challenging. We set up privies with the cutoff bottom of a barrel below the “seat” to catch waste products. Then the cans were emptied daily and the collective catch was taken about a mile away and burned. We specifically sought out climatic data regarding prevailing winds to ensure the selected burn site would be downwind of our encampment to avoid any unnecessary exposure to smoke. Simple, it was an exercise, no serious heat casualties, no foodborne illnesses, and no problems with solid waste disposal.
U.S. combat veterans may have been exposed to the health effects of open-air burn pits during their deployed service that could cause chronic health concerns.
Fast-forward nearly 30 years to the February 2015 release by the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR) of its report. This hard-hitting review of DOD’s approach to solid waste management and disposal during the past 13 years of combat seems in many ways unfair – especially if you have any understanding of the logistical requirements involved in setting up and maintaining overseas deployment sites in wartime or contingent settings. The list of concerns is long: security, power, water, berthing, bathing, feeding, equipment and vehicle maintenance, ten classes of supply, and yes – solid waste management and disposal. To add to the challenge, we are not talking about small populations at just a few sites for short durations. The peak US military population in Afghanistan in 2011, for example, was 110,000 personnel at many different sites, some of which had been inhabited since late 2001. Consider that the average airman, soldier, sailor, or Marine ashore produces eight pounds of waste per day including plastics, dining facility food, aerosol cans, electronic equipment, furniture, metal containers, tires, and batteries.
Burn Baby, Burn
In 2011, that totaled 440 tons of solid waste each day. That solid waste had to be moved, buried, or burned. Security issues in a combat zone limit the degree to which solid waste can be moved or buried. That leaves the option of burning, which in a perfect world would be carried out on a temporary basis via open-air burn pits as the deployment site is established, followed soon thereafter by the installation and use of a mechanical incinerator. In reality, in 2010 there were 20 operational solid waste incinerator systems in Afghanistan, 46 such systems awaiting installation. But there remained 251 active open-air burn pit sites. Why weren’t closed incinerator systems required and installed earlier?
Well, they were required, but not until years after the conflict began. In 2009, US CENTCOM developed policies and procedures to guide solid w