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Rethinking the Role of Religion in Counterinsurgency

Insurgent violence in the name of religion dominates our headlines. This summer, Boko Haram advanced rapidly across northeastern Nigeria in pursuit of its announced goal to create an Islamic state in the region. ISIS enjoyed similar success when it combined threats against Western involvement in the Middle East with the gruesome beheading of journalists and aid workers. More recently, the threat of domestic terrorism inspired by foreign guerrillas has surfaced in Ottawa and just last week, a horrific attack on worshippers in a Jerusalem synagogue resulted in the city’s deadliest mass killing in years.

Events like these leave us asking: What is it about religion that inspires such violence? Far less frequently do we consider the intense shock and outrage they provoke. Many of us, however, including government and military officials, exhibit a particularly fervent reaction to religious violence. Why? And, how might this influence the policies we advocate for and adopt in response?

 

Who Fights Matters

Despite the frequency and consequences of religious conflicts today, surprisingly little research explores the cultural, organizational, and cognitive biases that influence military planners’ reactions. Too often analysts assume states have fixed interests and will respond in a uniform way to any type of non-state challenger. When the role of religion is considered, attention overwhelmingly focuses on how it shapes rebel behavior.

Yet, research by social movement scholars over the past decade persuasively argues that the identity of dissenters can substantially affect the type and extent of force applied by the state, although their focus has been primarily on domestic police, not military forces. Christian Davenport, Sarah Soule, and David A. Armstrong, for instance, show in a recent study the impact of demonstrators’ race on police response. Examining U.S. protests between 1960 and 1990, they find that African-American protestors were more likely to attract a police presence than other groups and, once present, police were more likely to make arrests and use force and violence, especially before 1970.

Policymakers frequently emphasize the need for overwhelming force against insurgents perceived to be motivated by religion.

Terror at the Name of God

Building on this body of literature, my own research considers how the religious identity of insurgents can arouse a similar reaction in COIN planning and operations. While focusing on British security forces during the early postwar period, I find evidence that decision makers construe religious opposition movements as particularly violent and uncompromising. Across a diverse set of cases, however, one can find a tendency to prioritize coercive tactics over population-centric methods. For example, policymakers frequently emphasize the need for overwhelming force against insurgents perceived to be motivated by religion. Appeals within the U.S. foreign policy community that suggested “out-terrorizing” Islamist insurgents in Iraq and Afghanistan stand out as one notable instance. The call b