opinionWar

In Iraq, Where There is No Will, There is No Way

U.S. Secretary of Defense Ashton Carter stated in May 2015 that the Iraqis lost Ramadi because they lacked the will to fight. They outnumbered their Islamic State opponents, but the Iraqis had no strong desire to maintain control of Ramadi at the risk of death. Carter was met with stiff opposition from the Administration following his comments and quickly forced on his heels. However, his words likely exhibited some truth. Iraqis are now a few weeks into their campaign to take Ramadi back from the Islamic State with the help of American advisors and operations going “as planned.”

In June, as President Obama announced plans to deploy an additional 450 American service members to train Iraqi security forces, Judy Woodruff of PBS asked retired Colonel Andrew Bacevich if it was the right move. Bacevich said, “I’m sure they will be able to transfer some important skills to the people that they train, but will they be able to transfer the will to fight, which would seem to be the fundamental problem with the Iraqi forces that have basically been taking a licking from ISIS?”

America has given much to Iraq in very serious terms of both blood and treasure. Funding for the counter-ISIS fight in Iraq is escalating tremendously – now to the tune of $9.1 million per day. The familiar excuse of using military assistance or intervention to prevent the region from becoming a safe-haven for international terrorists at all costs is outdated. As Bacevich stated in response to former Defense Secretary Leon Panetta’s support of the previous strategy, U.S. military assistance in this area will foster greater instability, not stability. Re-training new recruits, shipping in weapons and trying to funnel aid directly to Kurdistan may keep American assistance in the game. But what should America’s role be in the counter-Islamic State fight?

Barry Posen and Stephen Walt pose a policy of containment as the most realistic answer. Unfortunately, America is in a position where they want stability and prosperity for Iraq more than Iraq wants stability and prosperity for itself. Iraqi national will is lacking and willpower cannot be taught through American advisors. Will is something that must be inspired. Will is driven by some underlying cause toward action. In the case of the Islamic State social movement, numerous individual underlying causes contributed