If there is one book worth reading (or rereading) this summer given the current state of the world, it’s Force Without War, published back in 1978. The basic premise of the book is that discrete and symbolic low-level uses of armed forces are effective at achieving near-term foreign policy objectives, but that the success rate erodes over time. We caught up with one of the books coauthors, Barry Blechman, a distinguished fellow at the Stimson Center (and cochair of a new task force report on preventing illicit trade), to discuss the book over 35 years after it was published, and what lessons it holds for our current efforts in Ukraine, Syria, and other crises abroad.

How can we demonstrate resolve and deploy force without war when it comes to deterring adversaries like Putin’s Russia? 

The main thing is that the most effective demonstration of resolve is by putting boots on the ground. That’s why if you look at Ukraine and the Russian maneuvers along its eastern border, the Russian threats are more credible than anything we could do, because we’ve made clear we would not get into a ground war over Ukraine. But it also says that if you want to limit the consequences of the Ukraine situation elsewhere in Europe, it would be more effective to put ground forces into, say, the Baltic states than just deploying F-16 and other fighter aircraft. And, indeed, we are now putting in 600 men into the Baltics for exercises. If we are concerned that Russian actions vis a vis Ukraine could create an unraveling of the NATO alliance, then we should be considering to deploy more permanent ground forces in NATO countries that border Russia.  Personally, I do not think this is necessary.  Nor do I think it would be wise, as it would only make it more difficult to eventually bring about a reconciliation with Russia, which should be the ultimate goal.

What role do targeted and escalated sanctions like the ones we see against Putin confidantes play into your formula for force without war, and are they effective? 

Targeted sanctions can be effective as complements to military threats or even as substitutes for them.  They must be of sufficient scale to truly impose economic hardship on the targeted leadership elites.  The Iran sanctions have been successful in getting Tehran to the negotiating table and to suspend its nuclear program.  The sanctions imposed so far on Putin’s buddies are unlikely to succeed in my view, however, as they are too narrow in scope.

You discuss the prospects of proxy warfare in your book, a concept that is making a resurgence. Is that a viable option in Ukraine?

You have to have a partner on the ground who is capable. I don’t see a Ukrainian opposition to Russia that has the moxie or ability to withstand the onslaught of Russian covert operative.  It’s remarkable what’s going on in eastern Ukraine, where Ukrainians seem unwilling to offer any resistance.  Without a confident partner, I don’t see what military options we might have.

When the adversary is a nuclear state, I would assume this limits our use of force. How can you project resolve when we are obviously unwilling to risk nuclear annihilation over, say, Kharkiv?

It depends on the history of the situation and the balance of interests between the US and the other nuclear power.  No one doubts we would risk nuclear war to defend the members of NATO – an alliance to which we have been committed for more than 60 years.  The Ukraine, though, is another story.  It’s not a member of NATO, the country itself is split, and there is a long history of it falling into Russia’s sphere of influence.  Threats of military intervention there would not be credible, which is not to say that we could not use diplomacy, economic sanctions, and economic and military aid to Kiev to help stabilize the situation.

Conversely, what role does nuclear weapons play in cajoling others or deterring aggression? Some say had Ukraine kept its nuclear weapons it would still have Crimea.  

Ukraine had ICBMs. It could not stop Russian subversion with them. I don’t see why Ukraine’s possession of nukes would have stopped Russia from subverting Crimea the way they did. Its a kind of low intensity war. It’s not really new. The Soviet Union did this in Eastern Europe following the Second World War. Its a kind of political warfare, combined with covert operations, so it’s not new. We’ve seem to have forgotten about that. Its not something weve thought about, but Putin apparently does have much greater ambitions than it seemed just a few years ago.  In the long run, I believe it will backfire against him, his cronies, and the Russian economy.

Talk a bit about coercion and deterrence, which relies on both capability and credibility. We have the former, but do we need more of the latter to carry out threats?