ISIS is officially the richest terrorist group in existence. Through its illicit oil sales worth between $1 million and $2 million a day—as well as kidnapping and extortion networks, robbery, front companies, racketeering, and outside donations, the group has amassed a $2 billion fortune. A cleverly-structured, disciplined and dynamic force, ISIS is able to adapt both militarily and economically to an evolving landscape quicker than its terrorist predecessors and competitors, as well as its adversaries like the U.S.  Attempting to defeat ISIS by starving it of funds is a smart approach. However, a look at the way it generates revenue and the tools America and its allies have available to block its financing shows this is easier said than done.

The Business of ISIS is Business

A comparison of ISIS and Al Qaeda’s initial revenue-generating strategies shows they both shared similar hierarchical structures in their early days and were dependent largely on outside donations. Both have since outgrown their dependence on outside funding and moved into generating their own revenue. Al Qaeda’s finances have never been as impressive as what ISIS has amassed in a much shorter time period. The formers “franchise” model necessitated “Al Qaeda Core” provide seed-funding to its affiliates, which were then encouraged to become self-sufficient thereafter. In contrast, ISIS remains a largely centralized and amalgamated organization that seeks to establish an “Islamic State.”

In order to achieve economic independence, for example, ISIS-predecessor Al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) sold stolen goods to make up the bulk of their earnings in 2005-2006, followed by car sales, transfers from other Al Qaeda affiliates, “spoils”revenue generated from the pillaging of “apostates”and, last, donations from ideological supporters. Al Qaeda’s fractured, flat structure necessitates crafty income generation, even going so far as committing identity theft, stealing credit card data, an